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Improving the Merger Control Process in 
Ireland 
*Paul K. Gorecki1,2 
INTRODUCTION 
In a recent paper Patrick Massey raised serious concerns about the quality of 
analysis in the Irish Competition Authority’s merger determinations.3 One of the 
five merger determinations reviewed could have been cleared, others perhaps 
prohibited. To improve the merger control process it was suggested that: 
 third or non-merging parties should have the right to appeal a Competition 
Authority merger determination to the Courts.  Such third parties might 
include unsuccessful bidders for the acquired firm as well as competitors, 
suppliers and customers of the merged entity; and, 
 the Competition Authority should undertake a full scale ex post review of its 
merger determinations to identify possible errors and areas for 
improvement.  A number of leading competition agencies have undertaken 
such reviews. 
 
We consider the merits of these proposals and of the criticisms of Competition 
Authority merger determinations.1   
 
THIRD PARTY APPEALS 
There are at least three reasons why third party appeals from Competition 
Authority merger determinations is not merited. We consider each in turn. 
 
First, appeals from merger determinations in Ireland take a long time to resolve.  
The case of Kerry Groups acquisition of Breeo Foods and Brands is the only 
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determination to be appealed to date.4 The Competition Authority made its 
merger determination on August 28, 2008 prohibiting the merger. The High Court 
annulled that determination on appeal in a judgment dated March 19, 2009. The 
Competition Authority appealed that decision to the Supreme Court on April 7, 
2009. As of May 2014 the case has yet to be been heard by the Supreme Court.  
 
Such Court-related delays create an incentive for third parties that are likely to be 
adversely affected by a merger to make a strategic decision to appeal the 
Competition Authority’s merger determination with a view to delaying, if not 
preventing, the implementation of the merger. Furthermore, other 
knowledgeable third parties might decide to appeal a Competition Authority 
merger determination in the expectation of receiving a side payment (i.e. a 
monetary payment) in exchange to withdrawing from any Court proceedings.  In 
both cases the market for corporate control is impaired, with no obvious benefit.   
 
Second, it could be argued that the Courts are not the appropriate forum to deal 
with complex economic issues raised in merger analysis.5  Typically judges are not 
trained in competition economics, nor is it always clear that the High Court judge 
charged with responsibility for competition cases has a strong background in 
competition law.  
 
Third, extensive and careful examination of the criticism, referred to above, made 
of the five important Competition Authority merger determinations found that 
these criticisms were either incorrect, misleading, confused, actually addressed in 
the Competition Authority’s merger determination or invalid. In some instances 
the criticism reflected legitimate differences in the analysis of the merger. In the 
one case where the criticism was valid, this would not have materially changed 
the finding in the relevant case.   
 
EX POST REVIEW 
This does not mean that the Competition Authority’s record of merger 
determinations should not be subject to review or is not capable of improvement.  
However, there are alternative less costly but as, if not more, effective 
approaches that could be used instead of third party appeals, one of which, ex 
post review, was suggested by Patrick Massey.6 Ex post review of the Competition 
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Authority’s merger determinations can be used to address issues such as: the 
quality of the merger analysis; whether the Competition Authority’s Merger 
Guidelines were applied appropriately; the degree to which the Competition 
Authority’s ex ante analysis is consistent with subsequent market developments; 
and, based on this analysis, suggestions for improving merger control. The year 
2014 would be an appropriate time to execute a full-scale merger review, 
notwithstanding budgetary pressures to which the Competition Authority is 
subject, given the current low volume of mergers being notified to the 
Competition Authority.7  
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